We consider decision makers who know that payo¤ relevant observations are generated by a process that belongs to a given class M , as postulated in Wald [36] . We incorporate this Waldean piece of objective information within an otherwise subjective setting a la Savage [33] and show that this leads to a two-stage subjective expected utility model that accounts for both state and model uncertainty.
Introduction
Consider a decision maker who is evaluating acts whose outcomes depend on some veri…able states, that is, on observations (workers'outputs, urns'drawings, rates of in ‡ation, and the like). If the decision maker believes that observations are generated by some probability model, two sources of uncertainty a¤ect his evaluation: model uncertainty and state uncertainty. The former is about the probability model that generates observations, the latter is about the state that obtains (and that determines acts'outcomes).
State uncertainty is payo¤ relevant and, as such, it is directly relevant for decision maker's decisions. Model uncertainty, in contrast, is not payo¤ relevant and its role is instrumental relative to state uncertainty. Moreover, models cannot be observed and, while in some cases they have a simple physical description (e.g., urns'compositions), often they do not have it (e.g., fair coins). 1 For all these reasons, the purely subjective choice models a la Savage [33] focus on the veri…able and payo¤ relevant state uncertainty. They posit an observation space S over which subjective probabilities are derived via betting behavior.
In contrast, classical statistical decision theory a la Wald [36] supposes that decision makers know that observations are generated by a probability model that belongs to a given subset M , whose elements are regarded as alternative random devices that Nature may select to generate First preliminary draft: May 2011. We thank Pierpaolo Battigalli and a seminar audience at U. Paris 1 for useful comments. The …nancial support of the European Research Council (advanced grant, BRSCDP-TEA) is gratefully acknowledged.
1 See Diaconis, Holmes, and Montgomery [8] for some physical analysis of coin tossing.
observations. 2 In other words, Wald's approach posits a model space M in addition to the observation space S. In so doing, Wald adopted a key tenet of classical statistics, that is, to posit a set of possible data generating processes (e.g., Normal distributions with some possible means and variances), whose relative performance is assessed via available evidence (often collected with i.i.d. trials) through maximum likelihood methods, hypothesis testing, and the like. Though models cannot be observed, in Wald's approach their study is key to better understand state uncertainty.
Is it possible to incorporate this Waldean key piece of objective information within Savage's framework? Our work addresses this question and tries to embed this classical datum within an otherwise subjective setting. Besides its theoretical interest, this question is relevant since some important economic applications assume, at least as a working hypothesis, this Waldean piece of information. For example, M may be the set of equilibrium distributions for observations (e.g., prices in a cobweb model a la Muth) .
Our approach takes the objective information M as a primitive and enriches the standard Savage framework with this datum: decision makers know that the true model m that generates data belongs to M . Behaviorally, this translates into the requirement that their betting behavior (and so their beliefs) be consistent with datum M : m (F ) m (E) 8m 2 M =) xF y % xEy where xF y and xEy are bets on events F and E, with x y. We do not, instead, consider bets on models and, as a result, we do not elicit prior probabilities on models through hypothetical (since models are not observable) betting behavior on models. Nevertheless, our basic representation result, Proposition 4, shows that, under Savage's axioms P.1-P.6 and the above consistency condition, acts are ranked according to the criterion
where is a prior subjective probability on models, whose support is included in M . We call this representation Classical Subjective Expected Utility because of the classical Waldean tenet on which it relies.
The prior is a subjective probability that may also re ‡ect some personal information on models that decision makers may have, in addition to the objective information M (Proposition 5 behaviorally characterizes its support). Uniqueness of corresponds to the linear independence of the set M . For example, M is linearly independent when its members are pairwise orthogonal. Remarkably, Section 5 shows that in intertemporal problems this condition is often satis…ed in applications. Speci…cally, consider a standard intertemporal observation space Z 1 whose points are in…nite histories (z 1 ; :::; z t ; :::) of observations. Suppose that Z is at most countable, and endow Z 1 with the …ltration fB t g generated by the elementary cylinder sets z t = fz 1 ; :::; z t g, that is, histories of observations. By Proposition 6, the conditional version of (1) at z t is
where m z j z t and m j z t are, respectively, the conditional model and the posterior probability given the observation history z t . In this intertemporal setting, pairwise orthogonality holds for collections of i.i.d. models (Proposition 14) and for collections of Markov chains (Proposition 15). Models that are widely used in applications thus satisfy the condition of linear independence that ensures the uniqueness of prior . Moreover, Section 6 shows that under this orthogonality condition there is full learning. That is, decision makers eventually behave as Expected Utility decision makers that know the true model that generates observations. They thus behave consistently with the observations they make, that is, they are long run empiricists. Classical Subjective Expected Utility thus provides a proper decision theoretic framework where to set a common justi…cation of rational expectations that, "with a long enough historical data record, statistical learning will equate objective and subjective probability distributions." 3 A …nal, more technical but equally noteworthy, feature of orthogonal data M is that for them the celebrated Lyapunov Convexity Theorem holds also in the in…nite case, something that in general is altogether false. In our Savagean setting this key nonatomic property allows to establish in Proposition 10 the representation (1) for countably in…nite orthogonal data.
As we detail in the paper, each prior induces a predictive probability on the sample space S through averaging:
In particular,
is the reduced form of V , its Savage Subjective Expected Utility representation. When M is a singleton fmg, we have = m for all priors and we thus get the von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility representation
where subjective probabilities do not play any role. 4 Classical Subjective Expected Utility thus encompasses both the Savage and von Neumann-Morgenstern representations.
In particular, the Savage criterion (2) is what an outside observer, unaware of datum M , would be able to elicit from decision maker's behavior. It is a much weaker representation than the "structural"one (1), which is the criterion that, instead, an outside observer aware of M would be able to elicit. For, this informed observer would be able to focus on the map ! from priors with support included in datum M to predictive probabilities. Under the linear independence of datum M , by inverting this map the observer would be able to recover prior from the predictive probability , which can be elicited through standard methods. The richer Waldean representation (1) is thus summarized by a triple (u; M; ), with supp M , while for the usual Savagean representation (2) is enough a pair (u; P ).
Summing up, though the work of Savage [33] was inspired by the seminal decision theoretic approach of Wald [36] , his purely subjective setup and the ensuing large literature 5 did not consider Wald's classical datum, central in Wald's approach. In this paper we show how to embed this datum in a Savage setting and how to derive the richer Waldean representation (1) by only considering choice behavior based on observables. Battigalli, Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2011) use the Wald-Savage setup of the present paper to study selfcon…rming equilibria.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic decision theoretic setting and some mathematical preliminaries. Section 3 presents the basic representation result, that Section 4 extends to in…nite data. Section 5 illustrates our representation in an important intertemporal setup, in which Section 6 shows that learning occurs. A few important issues, best discussed after the development of the paper analysis, are collected in the Concluding Remarks.
Preliminaries

Setting
We consider a standard Savage setting, where S is a nonempty state space and X is an outcome space. An act is a map f : S ! X that produces outcome f (s) in state S. Denote by F the set of all simple (i.e., …nitely valued) acts available to the decision maker.
We consider a binary relation % over F that represents the decision maker's preferences. We assume that % satis…es the classic Savage's axioms P.1-P.6. By the famous Savage Representation Theorem, due to Savage [33] , the preference % satis…es P.1-P.6 if and only if there is a utility function u : X ! R and a convex-ranged 6 …nitely additive probability P :
This representation is called Subjective Expected Utility (SEU).
Given any f; g 2 F and E 2 , we denote by f Eg the act equal to f on E and to g otherwise, that is,
Given any f; g 2 F and E 2 , the conditional preference % E is a binary relation on F such that f % E g whenever f Eh % gEh for all h 2 F. By P.2, the Sure Thing Principle, % E is well de…ned. In particular, an event E 2 is null if, for each f; g 2 F, we have f E g (see Savage [33, p. 24] ). The conditional preference % E satis…es P.1-P.6 if the primitive preference does (see, e.g., Kreps [22, Chapter 10] ). Hence, Savage's Theorem can be stated in conditional form by saying that % satis…es P.1-P.6 if and only if there is a utility function u : X ! R and a convex-ranged …nitely additive probability P : ! [0; 1] such that, for each nonnull events E,
represents % E . Here P ( j E) : ! [0; 1] is the conditional probability
Mathematics
We denote by the collection of all (countably additive) probability measures on . Unless otherwise stated, in the paper all probability measures are countably additive.
In the sequel we will often consider subsets M of . Given M , we consider M endowed with the -algebra
that is, with the smallest -algebra that makes the real valued and bounded functions on M , of the form m 7 ! m (E), measurable for all E 2 .
In the important special case M = we write D in place of M. If M then M = M \ D. Throughout the paper we assume that the -algebra D contains all singletons. This is the case if either is countably generated or if for eachm 2 M there existsẼ 2 such thatm Ẽ 6 = m Ẽ for all other m 2 M . This property of D implies that all …nite or countable sets M belong to D.
Probability measures : D ! [0; 1] will be interpreted as prior probabilities. If M is …nite or countable, each induces a posterior probability measure
A subset M of is said to be measure independent if, given any bounded measure :
If M is …nite, measure independence reduces to usual notion of linear independence. In other words, by setting M = fm 1 ; :::; m n g, given any collection of scalars
When the state space S is …nite, this condition further reduces to: given any collection of scalars
This is a condition of linearly independence of the jM j vectors (m (s) : s 2 S) 2 R jSj , which amounts to require that the rank of the associated jSj jM j matrix is full.
Two measures m andm in are orthogonal (or singular), written m ?m, if there exists E 2 such that m (E) = 0 =m (E c ). A collection of models M is (pairwise) orthogonal if all its elements are pairwise orthogonal.
If m (E) = 0 impliesm (E) = 0 for each E 2 , then we say thatm is absolutely continuous with respect to m and we writem m. In this case dm=dm denotes the Radon-Nikodym derivative ofm with respect to m. If we have bothm m and m m, we write m m and we say that m andm are equivalent.
In applications, probability models are often assumed to have a density. In our setting this means that there is a probability 2 such that m for all m 2 M . 7 In this case we say that M is dominated. Finite collections of models are trivially dominated, as well as countable ones: for, it is enough to set = P 1 k=1 2 k m k . Using a result of Halmos and Savage [14] , next we show that for orthogonal subsets this is the only case.
Lemma 1 An orthogonal subset M of is dominated if and only if it is …nite or countable.
Finally, a measure m 2 is nonatomic if, for each E 2 such that m (E) > 0, there exists F E such that 0 < m (F ) < m (E). We denote by na (S) the collection of all nonatomic probability measures. The main property of nonatomic measures is the classic Lyapunov Theorem that says that the range f(m 1 (E) ; :::; m n (E)) : E 2 g of a …nite collection fm i g n i=1 of nonatomic measures is a convex subset of R n . In particular, a single probability measure is nonatomic if and only if it is convex-ranged.
Finite representation
Basic result
The …rst issue to consider in our normative approach is how decision makers'behavior should re ‡ect the fact that they regard M as a datum of the decision problem. To this end, given a subset M of say that an event E is unanimous if 0 < m (E) = m 0 (E) < 1 for all m; m 0 2 M . In other words, all probability models in M assign the same probability to event E.
De…nition 2 A preference % is consistent with a subset M of if, for some outcomes x y, 7 The apparently weaker requirement that be -…nite is actually equivalent to be a probability, as Halmos and
for all F 2 and all unanimous E 2 .
Consistency requires that the decision maker is indi¤erent among bets on events that all probability models in M classify as equally likely. The next stronger consistency property requires that decision makers prefer to bet on events that are more likely according to all models.
De…nition 3 A preference % is order consistent with a subset M of if, for some outcomes x y, m (F ) m (E) 8m 2 M =) xF y % xEy (6) for all F 2 and all unanimous E 2 .
Both these notions are minimal consistency requirements among information and preference that behaviorally reveal that decision makers consider M as a datum of the decision problem. To an outside observer, aware of datum M , these consistency notions are the behavioral markers that reveal that the decision makers actually regard M as datum of the decision problem.
We can now state our basic representation results, which considers …nite sets M of nonatomic models.
Proposition 4 Let M be a …nite subset of na (S) and % a binary relation on F. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) % satis…es P.1-P.6 and it is order consistent with M ;
(ii) there exist a non-constant utility function u : X ! R and a prior :
represents %.
Moreover, u is cardinally unique, while is unique for each such % if and only if M is linearly independent.
Uniqueness of the prior is an important feature of this result. In fact, it pins down even though its domain is made of unobservable probability models. Because of the structure of , it is the linear independence of M -not just its a¢ ne independence -that turns out to be equivalent to this uniqueness property. This simple, but useful, fact is well known (see, e.g., Teicher [35] ).
Each prior : D ! [0; 1] induces a predictive probability : ! [0; 1] on the sample space through reduction:
The reduction map 7 ! relates subjective probabilities on the sample space to subjective probabilities on space of models, that is, prior and predictive probabilities. 8 Clearly, (7) implies that
which is the reduced form of V , its Savage's SEU form. As observed in the Introduction, this is the criterion that an outside observer, unaware of datum M , would be able to elicit from decision maker's behavior. It is a much weaker representation than the "structural" one (7), which can be equivalently written as
since supp M and M 2 D. This is the criterion that, instead, an outside observer aware of M would be able to elicit. For, denote by (M ) the collection of all priors such that supp M . The informed observer would be able to focus on the restriction M : (M ) ! of the reduction map on (M ). If M is linear independent, the restriction M is one-to-one and thus allows prior identi…cation from a behaviorally elicited Savagean probability P 2 through the inverse 1 M (P ), at least in principle. 9 The structural representation (7) is a version of Savage's representation that may be called Classical Subjective Expected Utility since it takes into account Waldean information, with its classical ‡avor. 10 In place of the usual SEU pair (u; P ) the representation is now characterized by a triple (u; M; ), with supp M . According to the Bayesian paradigm, the prior quanti…es probabilistically the decision maker's uncertainty about which model in M is the true one. This kind of uncertainty is sometimes called (probabilistic) model uncertainty or parametric uncertainty.
In the Introduction we observed that when datum M is a singleton fmg the Classical SEU criterion (7) reduces to
In this case it trivially holds = m and so subjective beliefs do not play any role. For this reason (10) is a von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility criterion, which is thus the special case of Classical SEU that corresponds to singleton data. In contrast, when M is nonsingleton but the support of some prior is a singleton, say supp = fmg withm 2 M , then it is the decision maker's personal information that prior re ‡ects that leads him to the Dirac predictive probability = m . In this case,
is a Savage's SEU criterion. 8 Notice that probability measures on S can play two conceptually altogether di¤erent roles: predictive probabilities and probability models. 9 In fact, computing inverses can be highly nontrivial, as the trapdoor functions of Di¢ e and Hellman [9] famously show. 1 0 Diaconis and Freedman [7] call "classical Bayesianism" the Bayesian approach that considers as a datum of the statistical problem the collection of all possibe data generating mechanisms.
Support
In Proposition 4 the support of the prior is included in M , i.e., supp M . For, because of consistency models are assigned positive probability only if they belong to datum M . But, the decision maker may well disregard some models in M because of some personal information that his subjective belief may re ‡ect. 11 In this case the inclusion is strict and (m) = 0 for some m 2 M .
Next we behaviorally characterize -through a consistency condition -the models in M that belong to the prior's support. These are the models that the decision maker believes to carry signi…cant probabilistic information for his decision problem. We consider linearly independent data M in view of the uniqueness result in Proposition 4. 12 Proposition 5 Let M be linearly independent. In Proposition 4, a model m 2 M belongs to supp if and only if, for all E F ,
for some x y.
The signi…cance of a model m is thus revealed by the rankings of nested events E F . Since they are nested, all models agree that m (E) m (F ). This agreement is what turns out to make it possible the behavioral identi…cation, through (11) , of the pivotal role of a model m, and so of whether it belongs to the support of the prior.
Variations
We close by establishing the conditional and orthogonal versions of Proposition 4. We begin with the conditional version, that is, with the counterpart of representation (4) under Waldean information.
Proposition 6 Let M be a …nite subset of na (S) and % a binary relation on F. The following conditions are equivalent:
(ii) there exist a non-constant utility function u : X ! R and a prior : D ! [0; 1], with supp M , such that, for all nonnull events E,
represents % E .
The representation of the conditional preference % E thus depends on the conditional model m ( j E) : ! [0; 1] and on the posterior probability ( j E) : D ! [0; 1] that, respectively, update in light of E the model m and prior . Criterion (12) shows how decision makers currently plan to use the information they may gather through observations to update their inference on the actual model that generates data. 13 The conditional predictive probability ( j E) :
The reduced form of (12) is thus given by
The conditional representations (12) and (14) are, respectively, induced by the primitive representations (7) and (9) via conditioning.
Orthogonality is a simple, but important, su¢ cient condition for linear independence.
Lemma 7 Orthogonal subsets M are linearly independent.
Section 5 will show that some fundamental classes of models satisfy this convenient condition. Because of its importance, the following result shows what form the Classical SEU representation of Proposition 4 takes in this case.
Proposition 8 Let M be a …nite and orthogonal subset of na (S) and % a binary relation on F. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) % satis…es P.1-P.6 and it is consistent with M ;
Moreover, is unique and u is cardinally unique.
Notice that here consistency su¢ ces and that the prior is automatically unique because of the orthogonality of M .
In…nite representation
We now consider in…nite data, that is, collections M that may have an in…nite number of elements. The extension of the previous representations to the in…nite case is nontrivial because the Lyapunov Theorem, which plays a key role in these Savagean results, in general fails for in…nite collections of nonatomic measures. 14 However, for the fundamental orthogonal case this classical theorem holds and we are thus able to establish an in…nite version of Proposition 8. To this end, we need the following stronger version of consistency.
De…nition 9 A preference % is strongly consistent with a subset M of if there are outcomes x y such that m (F ) = m (E) 8m 2 M =) xF y xEy (15) for all E; F 2 .
In other words, decision makers are indi¤erent among bets on events that, model by model, have the same probability. It is no longer enough to consider only unanimous events. Though stronger than consistency, condition (15) is still a natural consistency condition.
We can now state our main representation result, the in…nite version of Proposition 8. Recall that, by Lemma 1, dominated orthogonal subsets are …nite or countable.
Proposition 10 Let M be a dominated orthogonal subset of na (S) and % a binary relation on F. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) % satis…es P.1-P.6 and is strongly consistent with M ;
Since …nite collections M are trivially dominated, this result generalizes Proposition 8 to in…nite M , modulo the stronger version of consistency assumed. More importantly, the examples considered in the intertemporal setting show that orthogonal sets M of models are often used in applications.
The reduction map M between prior and predictive probabilities is easily seen to preserve convexity: for all 2 [0; 1] it holds + (1 ) 0 7 ! + (1 ) , and viceversa. More interestingly, in the orthogonal case it also preserves both orthogonality and equivalence, as next we show.
Proposition 11
Under the hypotheses of Proposition 10, two priors and 0 are orthogonal (resp., equivalent) if and only if their predictive probabilities and 0 are orthogonal (resp., equivalent).
Notice that the "if"part for orthogonality and the "only if"part for equivalence hold in general, even if M is not orthogonal.
Intertemporal illustration
We illustrate the previous results through a standard intertemporal decision problem where observations are generated over time. We …rst introduce the intertemporal setting and we then give a few important examples of orthogonal collections of probability models.
Setting
Consider an intertemporal decision problem where information builds up through observations generated by a sequence of random variables fZ t g de…ned on some (possibly unveri…able, except to Laplace's demon) underlying space and taking values on observation spaces Z t that, for ease of exposition, we assume to be at most countable (all results in this section actually hold in Polish spaces). For example, the sequence fZ t g can model subsequent draws of balls from a sequence of (possibly identical) urns; in this case Z t consists of the possible colors of the balls that can be drawn in urn t.
Suppose, for convenience, that all observation spaces are identical -each denoted by Z and endowed with the -algebra B = 2 Z -and that the relevant state space S for the decision problem is the overall sample space Z 1 = Q 1 t=1 Z. Its points z = (z 1 ; :::; z t ; :::) are the possible observation paths generated by the sequence fZ t g. Without loss of generality, we identify fZ t g with the coordinate process such that Z t (z) = z t .
Endow Z 1 with the product -algebra B 1 generated by the elementary cylinder sets z t = fz 1 ; :::; z t g = fz 1 g fz t g Z
The elementary cylinder sets are the observables in this intertemporal setting. In particular, the …ltration fB t g, where B 0 fS; ;g and B t is the algebra generated by the cylinders fz 1 ; :::; z t g, records the building up of observations. Clearly, B 1 is the -algebra generated by the …ltration
Since elementary cylinder sets z t are observable, conditioning relative to them is especially important. In particular, 15 the probability measure m j z t :
is the conditional distribution of model m given observations z t = fz 1 ; :::; z t g, while the probability measure :
is the posterior distribution of prior given observations z t = fz 1 ; :::; z t g.
In this intertemporal setting the pair (S; ) is thus given by (Z 1 ; B 1 ). The space of models consists of all probability measures m : B 1 ! [0; 1]. Acts are adapted outcome processes f = ff t g : Z 1 ! X, which we often call plans. The outcome space X has also a product structure X = C 1 , where C is a common instant outcome space. We consider Classical SEU representations
Its conditional version relative to cylinder sets z t is:
The function u : C 1 ! R in (17) and (18) is an intertemporal utility u (c) = u (c 1 ; :::; c t ; :::) that, under standard additional conditions, has a classic discounted form u (c 1 ; :::; c t ; ::
with subjective discount factor 2 [0; 1] and instantaneous utility function : C ! R. For instance, the discounted version of (18) is:
Throughout the section we assume that utility is bounded, that is, sup c2C 1 ju (c)j < 1. For example, in the discounting case (19) this condition holds provided instantaneous utility functions are bounded, that is, sup c2C j (c)j < 1.
A general singularity condition
A general characterization of the orthogonality of two measures in a …ltration setting is due to Kabanov, Liptser, and Shiryaev [17] , who generalized an earlier classic results of Kakutani [18] . To present it, denote by m t the restriction on B t of a model m 2 . Given two models m;m 2 such that m t m t for each t, let t : Z 1 ! R be their likelihood ratio given by
Given the two models m andm, the likelihood ratio process f t g can be constructed from observations; we will say more about it in Section 6. Here de…ne the conditional likelihood l t : Z 1 ! R by
The next fundamental lemma of Kabanov et al [17] 
The series in (22) 
In particular, a simple su¢ cient condition for (22) is
Condition ( In view of all this, to ease the derivation in the rest of the paper we will often consider models m that are strictly positive on each B t , that is, m t z t > 0 for each elementary cylinder z t . Clearly, any two such models have equivalent restrictions on B t . We denote by + the set of all models m : B 1 ! [0; 1] that are strictly positive on each B t .
Independence
An important special case of Proposition 13 is the i.i.d. case originally studied by Kakutani [18] . Consider a model m 2 that makes the coordinate process fZ t g i.i.d., with marginal distribution : B ! [0; 1]. In this case, m is a product probability on B 1 uniquely determined by the marginal . In particular, it holds m z t = Q t i=1 (z i ) on each elementary cylinder z t = fz 1 ; :::; z t g.
Proposition 14
A collection M + of models that make the coordinate process fZ t g i.i.d. is orthogonal.
For example, in the i.i.d. binomial case, with Z = f0; 1g and E m (Z 1 ) 2 (0; 1), we can parametrize M with the open unit interval (0; 1). By Proposition 14, the set M = fm g 2(0;1) is orthogonal. As observed by Kakutani [18, p. 223] , this would also follow from the strong law of large numbers, which implies m lim
represents %. As already observed, the reduced form
is what can be elicited from behavior without the knowledge of M . The predictive probability is exchangeable. In the purely subjective approach a la de Finetti that Savage adopted, from this reduced exchangeable form -via de Finetti Theorem-type arguments -it is inferred a candidate collection M of models, a "subjective datum," for which the structural form (23) holds. Here we follow an opposite Waldean path where M is an "objective datum" of the problem. The relations with the de Finetti subjective approach will be further discussed in the Concluding Remarks.
Gaussian and Markov cases
Consider a model m that makes the coordinate process fZ t g a Markov chain with transition functions t : Z B ! [0; 1] for t 1, where t (z t ; ) : B ! [0; 1] is strictly positive 16 for each z t 2 Z, and t ( ; z t+1 ) : Z ! [0; 1] is a function for each z t+1 2 B. Given an initial probability distribution 0 on B, the model m is uniquely determined by as follows:
for each cylinder set z t = fz 1 ; :::; z t g. Denote by k k the Euclidean norm of R jZj .
Proposition 15 A collection M + of models that make the coordinate process fZ t g a Markov chain is orthogonal if
for all m;m 2 M .
In the homogeneous case, when there is a transition function such that t = for all t, it is easy to see that condition (24) is always satis…ed. We thus have the following generalization of Proposition 14.
Corollary 16 A collection M
+ of models that make the coordinate process fZ t g a homogeneous Markov chain is orthogonal.
We close the study of the Markov case by observing that 2 1 p~ t (z t ; ) p t (z t ; ) is the Hellinger distance between the probability measures~ t (z t ; ) and t (z t ; ) on B. Condition (24) can thus be stated in terms of this distance.
For ease of exposition so far we considered at most countable Z, though the results of this section hold for Polish spaces. In this …nal part of this section we relax this assumption and suppose that Z = R endowed with its Borel -algebra. Consider a model m 2 that makes the coordinate process fZ t g independent with Gaussian marginal distribution t : B ! [0; 1] with parameters a t ; 2 t . The next result shows that a collection of independent Gaussian models is orthogonal under mild conditions on the parameters.
Proposition 17 A collection M of models that make the coordinate process fZ t g independent, with equivalent Gaussian marginals, is orthogonal if, for all m;m 2 M , either lim t~ 2 t = 2 t 6 = 1 or lim t a t 6 = lim tãt and lim sup t~ 2 t < 1.
Learning
Beliefs
In intertemporal decision problems, where conditional preferences are contingent upon more and more observations, it is important to see if decision makers eventually learn from observations the true model among those in the support of their prior probabilities (that is, among those that ex ante they regarded as possible data generating processes). Decision makers'long run behavior is consistent with observations, which asymptotically determine their behavior by "swamping" any subjective beliefs they may have.
The likelihood ratio process f t g plays a central role in the study of this issue. As well known, it is a martingale with respect to the …ltration fB t g and so, by the Martingale Convergence Theorem, it converges. If it converges to zerom-a.e., it means that asymptotically the data will reveal that m is the true model. The next known result 17 shows that orthogonality is necessary and su¢ cient for this key limit behavior of the likelihood ratio.
Lemma 18 Given any two probability measures m;m 2 , with m t m t for each t, it holds
We can thus distinguish asymptotically a true modelm relative to all orthogonal alternative models, and only relative to them. Without orthogonality, there can be only imperfect distinguishability among alternative models (i.e., among alternative simple hypotheses in the Statistics terminology).
The orthogonality condition (22) is thus equivalent to the limit condition (25) of Lemma 18. In particular, the important examples studied earlier in this section all satisfy condition (25) . This is the case for collections of i.i.d. models (Proposition 14), as well as collections of Markov chains under some mild conditions (Proposition 15). Remarkably, the models that are most widely used in applications are thus within the scope of Lemma 18.
When M is …nite and orthogonal, Lemma 18 ensures that asymptotically the true model in M will be detected almost surely. This key asymptotic property of the likelihood ratio easily translates in a consistency property of the prior . For, supposem 2 supp and let m t z t = m z t =m z t be the likelihood ratio of m with respect tom. Then (m j z 1 ; :::
and so (m j z 1 ; :::; z t ) ! 1m-a.e. The orthogonality of the true model with respect to all its possible alternative models is thus a necessary and su¢ cient condition for full learning, that is, for data to "swamp"the prior. Without this condition, there exist priors that, though they contain the true model in their support, will never learn the true model regardless of the available amount of data.
Propositions 14 and 15 show that this apparently strong orthogonality requirement is satis…ed in some fundamental cases that are widely used in applications. For them, Lemma 19 ensures full learning. 1 8 In the statement we have to require that the restrictions on each Bn are equivalent if, instead of
we only assume that M (Z 1 ).
Finally, in terms of predictive probabilities it is easy to see that, for all E 2 , it holds j (E j z 1 ; :::; z t ) m (E j z 1 ; :::; z t )j ! 1m-a.e.
under the hypotheses of the previous lemma. The predictive probability thus converges to the true model.
Dynamic Choices
The previous lemmas lead to a decision theoretic learning result that shows that Classical SEU decision makers will eventually learn the true model and behave accordingly. To establish this learning result we need to introduce a dynamic version of our representation. To this end, consider the nodes z t = fz 1 ; :::; z t g identi…ed by histories of observations z t up to t. In the dynamic setting they are decision nodes and, for this reason, at each of them there is a preference z t over continuation plans from this node onwards, so that the family f z t g characterizes a decision maker at all possible nodes that he can reach. In particular, %= ; . That is, the primitive static preference studied so far may be regarded as the empty history preference in the family z t . 19 The domain of each preference z t is the set F of plans. However, to capture the idea that only continuation plans matter we require Consequentialism, that is, f z t ; z t+1 ; ::: = g z t ; z t+1 ; :::
for all f; g 2 F. Another classical property of the family f z t g of preferences is Dynamic Consistency, that is, given any two plans f and g that are identical up to node z t , it holds
That is, the original ranking of plans at node z n is not reversed once the node is reached. A Classical SEU preference representation for z t that satis…es Consequentialism and Dynamic Consistency is the preference functional W z t : F ! R given by
where supp is included in some set M of models, m z j z t is the conditional distribution of future observations given the past ones z t , and u t : C 1 ! R are recursive intertemporal utilities that satisfy equations u t (c t ; :::) = (c t ; u t+1 (c t+1 ; :::))
for some suitable aggregator : C R ! R (cf. Marinacci and Montrucchio [26, p. 1790] ). 1 9 Notice that z n and %zn denote altogether di¤erent notions: the former is a primitive preference at node z n , the latter is the conditional preference of the primitive static preference % in light of evidence z n . It is also important to observe that Z 1 = k>n Z and C 1 = k>n C, that is, the possible future observations at node z n are identical as at the initial node.
We call the family fW z t g given by (29) a recursive Classical SEU representation. It is summarized by the triple (fu t g ; M; ), with supp M . 20 In particular, W ; is the Classical SEU criterion (17) .
For example, if (c; y) = (c) + y , we have the discounted form
whose recursive form is 21
Long run empiricists
We can now state our learning result.
Proposition 20 Suppose (fu t g ; M; ) is a recursive Classical SEU decision maker, with …nite and orthogonal M . Ifm 2 supp is the true model, then
for all plans f 2 F.
The focus on orthogonal sets M is natural in view of the previous two lemmas. As observations build up, a Classical SEU decision maker will thus behave more and more like a decision maker that knows the true model. That is, like a SEU decision maker Z Z 1 u t (f t (z) ; :::) dm z j z t that uses the correct conditional distribution of future observations. Classical SEU decision makers are thus long run empiricists.
The reduced form of (29) is given by
where z j z t is the conditional predictive distribution of future observations given history z t . From (28) it follows that, under the hypotheses of Proposition 20, it holds:
The reduced form thus converges to the correct Expected Utility model.
2 0 An axiomatic derivation, along the lines of Johnsen and Donaldson [16] , of the recursive criterion (29) is beyond the scope of the present paper. 2 1 See the Appendix for a short derivation.
Concluding remarks
Perspectives Our "classical" approach is very di¤erent, in a sense opposite, to the purely subjective derivations -through de Finetti Theorem-type arguments -of priors over collections M of models. In a nutshell, while in our approach datum M is a primitive notion upon which the analysis relies, in the de Finetti approach it is a subjective construct, a "subjective datum/parameterization", inferred from the large sample betting behavior peculiar to the de Finetti Theorem. As we remarked in Section 5.3, these arguments -widely discussed in the Bayesian literature -show when subjective predictive probabilities can be viewed as derived within a subjective parametric setup (see Al-Najjar and De Castro [1] , Epstein and Seo [11] , Klibano¤, Mukerji, and Seo [21] , and Cerreia-Vioglio et al [5] for recent decision theoretic analyses of parametric models along these lines).
In contrast, here the class M is an element, a datum, of the problem and our purpose is to investigate how to embed it in an otherwise subjective setting. In applications where it is natural to assume the existence of a datum M , a de Finettian perspective would be a straitjacket. This is why here we take a di¤erent approach, in which classical and subjective features coexist.
Relatedly, a version of the orthogonal representations of Propositions 8 and 11 (but not of our basic result, Proposition 4) can be derived in an Ascombe-Aumann setting using the techniques of [5] . 22 However, the original motivation of [5] is in a de Finetti perspective that, as just noticed, is di¤erent from our Waldean one. As a result, our paper is set in a Savage setting (with consistency notions purely based on betting behavior) and, more generally, its analysis develops along altogether di¤erent lines than that of [5] , both conceptually and mathematically.
Marschak Some works of Jacob Marschak have been a source of inspiration of our exercise, in particular his [27] and [28] articles. The former paper discusses a version of criterion (1), nicely summarized by the sentence "to be an 'economic man'implies being a 'statistical man'" that we mentioned after Proposition 6.
More importantly, our work addresses the issue that he raised in the latter paper, in which he asked how to pin down subjective beliefs on models from observables. In so doing, our analysis also shows that to study general data M , possibly linearly dependent, it is necessary to go beyond betting behavior on observables. For example, the study of second order acts in Klibano¤, Marinacci, and Mukerji [20] goes in that direction, though the classic work of Marschak and Radner [29] already considered acts -and so bets -on models in a Savage framework. 23 Experimentation In our Savagean setting uncertainty is exogenous in that it is not a¤ected by decision makers'choices. As a result, there is no room for experimentation, that is, choices whose purpose is to acquire information on how uncertainty may resolve. The extension of Classical SEU to include endogenous uncertainty is a natural next step in our analysis. This would allow to relate our decision theoretic framework to control models a la Easley and Kiefer [10] , which used versions of the functional form (1) to study learning with endogenous uncertainty.
Model uncertainty Throughout the paper the datum M was supposed to be known to the decision maker, there is no uncertainty about it. In other words, the decision maker has enough information to identify the collection of all models that can generate the observations. If this is not the case we have a further source of uncertainty, which is often called statistical model uncertainty (see, e.g., Claeskens and Hjort, [6] ). This would add a further layer in the representation (7) with a "meta-prior" over 2 M .
Principal Principle
for all priors with supp M . In other words, if all models in M agree that the probability of some event E is , then its predictive probability is also , regardless of any personal information that a prior might re ‡ect.
Mutatis mutandis, this property can be seen as a form of the Principal Principle of Lewis [23] , an important notion in the Philosophy of Probability that requires that degrees of beliefs be consistent with objective chances, and only with them (any other possible information on events becomes irrelevant once objective chances are available).
Axiom P.6 Since M na (S), it is easy to see that axiom P.6 is no longer needed in the …rst part of the proof of Savage's Representation Theorem that derives the subjective probability P . However, it is still needed later in the proof of Savage's Theorem (see his Theorem 5.2.2) and this is why it appears in our Proposition 4.
Appendix: proofs and related analysis
Denote by (M ) the collection of all probability measures : M ! [0; 1]. Given a set M , among priors and predictive distributions there is a two ways relation. For example, given a predictive probability P denote by M (P ) the (possibly empty) set of priors 2 (M ) that induce P , that is, M (P ) = f 2 (M ) : P = g. On the other hand, each prior induces a predictive probability .
It is easy to see that the correspondence M : ! 2 (M ) is convex valued and with disjoint images, i.e., M (P ) \ M (P 0 ) = ; if P 6 = P 0 . Given M , the e¤ective domain of M is de…ned to be dom M = fP 2 : M (P ) 6 = ;g
In general dom M , is the collection, f : 2 (M )g, of all predictive probabilities that are induced by priors in (M ). If M is …nite then dom M = co (M ). We say that P is M -representable if M (P ) 6 = ; and if, in addition, M (P ) is a singleton, we say that P is M -identi…able. 24 Lemma 21 Given M , each predictive probability P 2 dom M is M -identi…able if and only if M consists of measure independent models.
Proof We …rst prove su¢ ciency. Consider P 2 dom M . Assume that M consists of measure independent models. Since P 2 dom M , there exists 2 (M ) such that P = . Next, consider
We have that is a bounded measure on M. It follows that for each
Since M consists of measure independent models, it follows that 1 2 = = 0, that is, 1 = 2 . This proves the uniqueness of and the M -identi…ability of P . As to the converse, assume that each P 2 dom M is M -identi…able. By contradiction, assume that M does not consist of measure independent models. Thus, there exists a bounded measure : M ! R such that
Since is a bounded signed measure, admits a decomposition in terms of two …nite measures, in other words, = + where + and are, respectively,the positive and negative part of . By (33), we have that
Since 6 = 0, this implies that
It follows that 1 ; 2 2 (M ), 1 6 = 2 , and = 1 2 . By (33), we have that for each A 2
If we de…ne P by 1 = P = 2 then we have that P 2 dom M but 1 6 = 2 , a contradiction with each P 2 dom M being M -identi…able.
Proof of Lemma 1 By Lemma 7 of Halmos and Savage [14] , there is a countable subsetM = fm 1 ; :::; m n ; :::g M such that
It holdsM = M . Suppose there is m 0 2 M such that m 0 = 2M . Consider the countable familỹ M [ fm 0 g of pairwise orthogonal probability measures. By Lemma 23-(i), there is a partition fE n g n 0 such that, for each n 0, m n (E n ) = 1 and m n (E k ) = 0 if k 6 = n. This contradicts (34) since m 0 (E 0 ) = 1 and m (E 0 ) = 0 for all m 2M .
Proof of Proposition 4 (i) implies (ii) By Savage's Theorem, there exist a non-constant function u : X ! R and a unique convex-ranged P : ! [0; 1] such that for each f and g in F
By order consistency, there exists a unanimous event E 2 such that for each F 2
By assumption, each m is convex-ranged. By Theorem 20 of Marinacci and Montrucchio [25] and since it is immediate to check that E is a radial set, we have that P 2 cone M . Since P 2 , it follows that P 2 co M . In turn, this implies that P is countably additive and that there is a probability :
Hence, we can conclude that
Since the support of is a subset of M , it is immediate to see that it consists of nonatomic elements.
(ii) implies (i) De…ne P = . Since each m 2 M is a nonatomic probability measure, we next show that P is a nonatomic probability measure as well. Indeed, it is enough to prove that P is convex ranged. Consider E 2 such that P (E) > 0 and 2 (0; 1). Since the collection fm i g n i=1 is a collection of nonatomic probability measures, by the Lyapunov Theorem there exists F 2 such that m (F ) = m (E) for all m 2 M . This implies that
represents % where P is nonatomic. By Savage's Theorem, it follows that % satis…es P.1-P.6. At last, we show that % is order consistent with M . Let E be an unanimous event and let x y. Without loss of generality assume that u (x) = 1 and u (0) = 0. If F 2 is such that m (F ) m (E) (resp., m (F ) = m (E)) for each m 2 M then V (xF y) = (F ) (E) = V (xEy) (resp., V (xF y) = (F ) = (E) = V (xEy)), and so xF y % xEy (resp., xF y xEy).
Finally, the cardinal uniqueness of u is obvious. The uniqueness of follows from Lemma 21 and the uniqueness of the predictive probability P derived in (i) implies (ii).
Proof of Proposition 5 Set M = fm 1 ; :::; m n g. By Proposition 4,
with each i 0 and P n i=1 i = 1. To prove the "only if" part, wlog suppose that m 1 2 supp , so that 1 
As to the converse, supposem 2 M is such that (11) holds for all E F . We want to show thatm 2 supp . SetM = fm 2 M : m 6 =mg. Let
Clearly, ~ . We want to show that 6 =~ . Suppose, per contra, that =~ . This implies that,
for all E,
Since each m 2 M is convex-ranged, from Marinacci and Montrucchio [25, Theorem 20] it follows thatm 2 spanM , which contradicts the linear independence of M . We conclude that 6 =~ .
LetẼ 2~ andẼ = 2 . Then, 1=2 = m Ẽ 6 =m Ẽ for all m 2M . If P =m, we trivially havem 2 supp . If P 6 =m, there is some m 2M such that (m) > 0. Since m Ẽ = 1=2, by (35) this implies P Ẽ > 0. By the Lyapunov Theorem, there is F Ẽ such that P (F ) = 2 1 P Ẽ and m (F ) = 2 1 m Ẽ for all m 2 M . Then,
and so (m) > 0. We conclude thatm 2 supp .
Proof of Proposition 6 Let P (E) > 0. By (4),
Hence,
as desired.
Proof of Proposition 8 By Savage's Theorem, there exist a non-constant function u : X ! R and a unique convex-ranged P :
By (5),
for all F 2 . Since each m is convex-ranged, from Theorem 20 of Marinacci and Montrucchio [25] it follows that P 2 span M , i.e., there is a collection
P n i=1 i = 1. By Lemma 7, there exists a partition fE i g n i=1 such that m i (E i ) = 1 for each i = 1; :::; n. Hence, for each i it holds P (E i ) = i , and so i 0. We conclude that P 2 co M . The rest of the proof is similar to that of Proposition 4.
Proof of Lemma 7 See Lemma 23.
Proof of Proposition 11 By Lemma 1, M is countable. We …rst consider orthogonality and then equivalence. 
and
which implies ? 0 . As to the converse, suppose ? 0 . There exists E 2 such that (E) = 1 = 0 (E c ). Set A = fm 2 M : m (E) > 0g. We have A 2 D since A is countable. It holds
and so (A) = 1. Moreover,
If 0 (m) > 0 for somem 2 A, then for all m 0 = 2 A, so that
This implies
and so 0 (A) = 0. We conclude that 0 . A similar argument shows that 0 .
Proof of Proposition 14
Given any two such models m andm, if they are equivalent it holds l n = d =d~ . Hence, condition (22) becomes
and so
Since d =d~ 0, by the Jensen inequality it holds 0 R
that is, if and only if =~ . We conclude that condition (38) holds if and only if m andm are distinct. Hence, M consists of pairwise orthogonal probability measure.
The next result implies, as a special case, Proposition 17.
Proposition 22 Two probability measures m;m 2 that make the coordinate process fZ n g independent, with equivalent Gaussian marginals, are orthogonal provided
Proof It follows from Kabanov et al [17] and Lemma 7.
Proof of Proposition 15 Letm; m 2 M . It holds
and so l n (z 1 ; :::; z n ) =
By Lemma 12, the probability measuresm and m are orthogonal if and only if
In particular, this is the case if (24) holds.
Proof of Corollary 16
Letm and m be two distinct elements of M , so that 6 =~ . Then, there are
> 0, and so (24) holds.
Proof of Lemma 18 Set p = 2 1 (m +m). By Lemma 5 of Kabanov et al [17] , the process f n g convergesm-a.e., withm
It remains to show thatm (dm=dp = 0) = 1 if and only if m ?m. The "only if" is obvious since m dm dp = 0 = Z n dm dp
=0
o dm dp dp = 0 that implies m ?m. As to the converse, suppose there is E 2 B 1 such that m (E) = 0 and m (E) = 1. Then, 0 = m (E) = Z E dm dp dp =) p E \ dm dp > 0 = 0 =)m E \ dm dp > 0 = 0.
But,m (E) = 1 impliesm (E \ (dm=dp > 0)) =m (dm=dp > 0), and som (dm=dp > 0) = 0. This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 19 "If" Let m 2 M . Sincem ? m for eachm 6 = m 2 supp , by Lemma 18 it holds (27) , and so (26) holds. As to the converse, from (26) it follows that (27) holds for each m 6 = m 2 supp . By Lemma 18,m ? m for eachm 6 = m 2 supp .
Derivation of (31) Using (13) and, via the reduced form, the recursive form of expected utility we can write
Proof of Proposition 20 Let f 2 F and " > 0. By Lemma 19, there is n " such that,m-a.e., (m j z 1 ; :::; z n ) 1 " and (m j z 1 ; :::; z n ) " 8m 6 = m 2 supp
Then,m-a.e., it holds
and so (32) holds.
Proof of Proposition 10
The proof of this proposition relies on few lemmas.
Lemma 23 Let M = fm 1 ; :::; m n ; :::g be a countable subset of . If the elements of M are pairwise orthogonal, then:
(i) there exists a countable partition fE n g such that m n (E n ) = 1 and m n (E k ) = 0 if k 6 = n;
(ii) M is measure independent.
Proof of Lemma 23 (i) Suppose that M = fm 1 ; :::; m n ; :::g consists of pairwise orthogonal elements. Consider m 1 . For each i 6 = 1 there is E 1i 2 such that m 1 (E 1i ) = 1 = m i (E c 1i ). By
E 1i we then have m 1 (E 1 ) = 1 and m i (E 1 ) = 0 for each i 6 = 1. Consider m 2 . Since m 2 (E c 1 ) = 1, for each i > 2 there is an event E 2i E c 1 such that m 2 (E 2i ) = 1 = m i (E c 2i ). By setting E 2 = \ i6 =1 E 2i we then have m 2 (E 2 ) = 1 and m i (E 2 ) = 0 for each i > 2. By proceeding in this way we can construct the desired partition.
(ii) Given any collection f n g of scalars, from n m n (E n ) + P k6 =n k m k (E) = 0 it follows n = 0 for each n. Hence, M is measure independent.
The next lemma could be proved through the notion of thin set due to Kingman and Robertson [19] , but we prefer a simpler direct approach.
Lemma 24 Let M = fm 1 ; :::; m n ; :::g be a countable subset of nonatomic measures in . If the elements of M are pairwise orthogonal, except at most a …nite number of them, then f(m 1 (E) ; :::; m n (E) ; :::) : E 2 g is a convex subset of R 1 .
Proof Suppose that all elements of M , except one, are pairwise orthogonal. To ease notation, let us write M as fp; m 1 ; :::; m n ; :::g, where p is the unique element not pairwise orthogonal. We want to show that R M = f(p (E) ; m 1 (E) ; :::; m n (E) ; :::) : E 2 g is a convex subset of R Fix n. Since p and each m n are nonatomic, the Lyapunov Theorem implies that for each of pair (m n ; p) there is an event E n E n such that m n (E n ) = m n (A \ E n )+(1 ) m n (B \ E n ) and p (E n ) = p (A \ E n )+(1 ) p (B \ E n ) :
Let E = [ n E n be the union of the pairwise disjoint events fE n g that we just found. It holds m n (E ) = m (E n ) for each n, and and so x + (1 ) y 2 R M . This completes the proof when there is a unique element of M that is not pairwise orthogonal. If there is a …nite number of them, say fp 1 ; :::; p k g, we can proceed as before by applying the Lyapunov Theorem on each (m n ; p 1 ; :::; p k ). By Lemma 24, there is E 2 such that P (E ) = P (A) + (1 ) P (B) and m n (E ) = m n (A) + (1 ) m n (B) 8n 1.
Hence, Claim Let fx s g l 1 be uniformly bounded (i.e., kx s k K for all s and some K > 0) and such that x s n ! x n for each n. Then, L (x s ) ! L (x).
Proof of the claim It is enough to show that, if fx s g [0; 1] 1 is such that x s n ! 0 for each n, then F (x s ) ! 0. Let fE s g be such that
x s = (m 1 (E s ) ; :::; m n (E s ) ; :::) 8s 1
Hence m (E s ) ! 0 for all m 2 M . By Lemma 25, this implies P (E s ) ! 0, and so F (x s ) ! 0.
Since, by the Claim, the bounded linear functional L : l 1 ! R is bounded pointwise continuous, there exists 2 l 1 such that L (x) = P n n x n for each x 2 l 1 . In particular, this implies
Since P (S) = P n n m n (S) it follows P n n = 1. By Lemma 23, there is a partition fE n g such that m n (E n ) = 1 for each n. Then, P (E n ) = n m n (E) = n for each n and so n 0 for each n, as desired.
